The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is challenging an economic arrangement that has made its minerals indispensable to global industry without delivering commensurate benefits to its people. At its heart is a question of economic sovereignty: can control over strategic resources translate into lasting prosperity, or will it reinforce dependence on foreign finance, technology and industrial networks?

According to the Cobalt Institute, the DRC supplied 73 per cent of global mined cobalt in 2025, while China accounted for 79 per cent of refined cobalt production. Congo possesses the geological advantage, but China commands much of the processing capacity that transforms raw minerals into valuable industrial materials.

Chinese investment has expanded mining capacity, but equitable partnerships must also deliver fair ownership, taxation, infrastructure, environmental protection and domestic industrial development.

The Sicomines agreement illustrates the imbalance. Signed in 2008, it gave Chinese investors a 68 per cent stake in a copper and cobalt venture with state-owned mining company Gécamines. The arrangement was intended to use mineral revenues to finance roads, hospitals and other public infrastructure.

The infrastructure commitment at the centre of the dispute was initially valued at $3 billion. However, a 2023 investigation by Congo’s General Inspectorate of Finance found that only $822 million had been spent on infrastructure. The disparity exposed weaknesses in an arrangement justified partly by its development promises.

President Félix Tshisekedi’s government pushed for renegotiation. In January 2024, Chinese partners announced an infrastructure investment commitment of up to $7 billion, while retaining the existing shareholding structure. Revised terms also included an annual royalty payment of 1.2 per cent.

Congo secured a larger commitment, but Chinese majority ownership remained intact. But a larger commitment is not completed development; its value depends on disbursement, procurement, construction quality and independent verification.

China’s advantage extends beyond individual concessions. The International Energy Agency estimates that it accounts for roughly 70 to 75 per cent of global cobalt processing. This dominance strengthens China’s position in battery supply chains and limits producers’ access to alternative buyers with comparable processing capacity.

Congo therefore faces a structural challenge that cannot be resolved through contract renegotiation alone. It must build the skills, institutions and infrastructure needed to capture more value at home over time. Exporting raw minerals or intermediate products cannot deliver the same industrial benefits as producing refined materials, advanced components and manufactured goods. Changing this requires reliable electricity, transport, technical training and viable processing facilities. Replacing Chinese investors with other foreign companies would not, by itself, dismantle an economic model built around extracting and exporting raw materials.

Congo’s cobalt export restrictions demonstrate its willingness to use market leverage. After suspending exports in February 2025, the government introduced a quota system in October. The announced annual ceiling for 2026 was 96,600 tonnes, including a strategic allocation of 9,600 tonnes.

However, export restrictions carry risks. Higher prices can encourage competing production, recycling and technological substitution. By October 2026, market reporting indicated that inventories, recovering shipments and alternative supplies were limiting the support that tighter Congolese controls provided to prices.

Congo is also seeking to change who benefits from mining expenditure. In September 2026, its subcontracting regulator ordered major operators, including Sicomines, Glencore and Ivanhoe’s Kipushi mine, to address non-compliant arrangements and expand opportunities for Congolese suppliers. Applying these requirements consistently is essential. Economic sovereignty requires predictable rules, not selective action against Chinese businesses.

Enforcement against illegal mining provides another test. In January 2025, a Congolese court sentenced three Chinese nationals to seven years in prison following convictions linked to illegal artisanal mining. Authorities had arrested them with gold bars and $400,000.

Environmental accountability is equally important. In November 2025, authorities suspended operations at Congo Dongfang International Mining, a subsidiary of China’s Zhejiang Huayou Cobalt, following a spill that affected neighbourhoods in Lubumbashi. The government ordered environmental repairs, compensation for affected communities and continued employee payments.

Congo’s effort to reclaim its natural wealth must confront domestic governance as firmly as foreign commercial power. Transparent contracts, credible oversight of mining revenues and independent environmental monitoring are essential safeguards against replacing external exploitation with domestic elite capture. Local ownership must mean productive participation, not benefits for politically connected intermediaries.

China should support transparent agreements and ensure its companies comply with Congolese laws, remedy environmental damage and honour infrastructure commitments. The DRC government must enforce those obligations consistently, regardless of the nationality of the companies involved.

Congo’s challenge is not simply to renegotiate its relationship with China. It is to redefine how its natural wealth contributes to national development. Africa cannot remain a supplier of strategic minerals while greater industrial value is created elsewhere. For Congo, true economic sovereignty will be measured not by the volume of minerals extracted or foreign investment secured, but by the jobs created, industries developed, public services improved and lasting prosperity delivered to its people.